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parties, yet the necessary effect of the decision noted is to give new life
to an old and technical refinement of very shadowy substance.
Today more and more states are reflecting a far broader policy
toward pleading in general by adopting provisions similar to those con-
tained in the new proposed federal rules which repudiate the strict,
cumbersome, legalistic techniques of a former day in favor of a system
better adapted to a more efficient administration of justice. Therefore,
since the ground has already been broken by the Townsend case, and
since a joinder of these two causes is within the letter and spirit of our
law, it would seem that the way is clear for the courts of Ohio to place
themselves in accord with the more liberal trend of the day. This should
be done as soon as conveniently possible so as to permit such a joinder
as was attempted in the principal case.
ROBIN W. LETT
TORTS
JUDICIAL NOTICE - NEGLIGENCE OF BAILEES - ORDINANCES
AS SAFETY AND INDEMNITY MEASURES
Plaintiff filed an action in Municipal Court of Cincinnati against
defendant for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident
caused by a car owned by defendant and rented to one Jesse Dunn.
The city enacted an ordinance, No. 50-1927, in Feb., 1929, which
provided in effect, that no license to operate any public vehicle should
be issued by City Treasurer until the applicant should deposit with the
City Treasurer a policy of liability insurance, providing for indemnity
for or protection to the insured against loss as provided under this
ordinance. It also provided that it should be unlawful to operate any
such public vehicle, or permit such vehicle to be operated until the
requirements of the ordinance had been complied with, and imposed a
fine for its violation. The defendant in violation of the above ordinance
rented a car to Jesse Dunn against whom the present plaintiff had
obtained a judgment which was not satisfied. The plaintiff in the
present action was denied relief by the Municipal Court, and on appeal
the appellate court reversed the judgment. The Supreme Court re-
versed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial
courts, denying plaintiff recovery. Orose v. Hodge Drive-It-Yourself
Co., 132 Ohio St. 607, 9 N.E. (2d) 671 (1937).
One of the defenses offered was that the upper court would not take
judicial notice of the ordinance, since it was not contained in the record.
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The Ohio Supreme Court had not previously passed on this question.
The lower courts of the state and the courts of other states are i con-
flict. Courts which refuse to notice the ordinance usually base their
decisions on the inconvenience that would result to an upper court if it
were required to search for municipal ordinances. Nelson v. Berea, 21
Ohio C.C. 781, 12 C.D. 329 (19oi); Gates v. Cleveland, 18 Ohio
C.C. (N.S.) 349, 33 C.D. 8o (1911); State v. McCoy, I4 Ohio L.A.
363 (1933); Esch v. Elyra, 7 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 9, 17 C.D. 446
(1905); Euclid v. Bramley, 20 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 453, 31 C.D. 396
(1915). Courts taking the contrary view usually rely on an analogy to
the Federal rule. Akerman v. Lima, 7 Ohio N.P. 92, 8o O.D. (N.P.)
430 (1898); Strauss v. Conneaut, 3 C.C. (N.S.) 445, 13 C.D. 320
(1902); Jackson v. Copelan, 50 Ohio App. 414, 198 N.E. 596
(1935); Town of Moundsville v. Velton, 35 W. Va. 217, 13 S.E. 373
(1891); City of Spokane v. Knight, 96 Wash. 403, 165 Pac. 105
(1917). The United States Supreme Court will take judicial notice
of a state statute in a case on appeal from the state court. Hanley v.
Donoghue, 16 U.S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. 242 (1885); Western Life Indem-
nity Co. v. Ru&P, 235 U.S. 261, 35 Sup. St. 37 (1914)- In a previous
note in 2 O.S.U. L. J. 164, the two lines of decision were compared
and a conclusion reached that the view favoring the taking of judicial
notice was to be preferred. The Ohio Supreme Court in this case by
a four-to-three vote reached the same conclusion.
The Supreme Court agreed with defendants' contention that the
bailor was not liable at common law for an injury to a third person
caused by the negligence of the bailee. This is in accord with the great
weight of authority in the absence of statute. McColligan v. Penna. R.
Co., 214 Pa. St. 229, 63 Adt. 792 (19o6); New York etc. Ry. Co. v.
New Jersey Elec. Ry. Co., 6o N.J.L. 338, 38 Ad. 828 (1897);
Thompson v. New Orleans R. Co., io La. Ann. 403 (1885) ; Herlihy
v. Smith, 116 Mass. 265 (1874); Rockford v. Nolan, 316 Ill. 6o,
146 N.E. 564 (1925); 3 R.C.L. 145, 92 Am. St. Report 547 note.
In Ohio an early case imputed the negligence of the bailee to the bailor
so as to bar the latter's action against a third party. Puterbaugh v.
Reasor, 9 Ohio St. 484, 6 A.L.R. 316 N. (1859). The modern trend
is decidedly against the doctrine of Puterbaugh v. Reasor. A.L.I. Re-
statement of Torts, sec 489, Gfell v. Jefferson, 31 Ohio C.A. 214
(1917); Victor Tea Go. v. Walsh, 38 Ohio App. 516, 34 O.L.R.
418 (I93I).
But did the ordinance change the common law? The ordinance, in
effect, imposed a penalty for renting a car without first taking out
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insurance. The ordinance did not provide that a party injured by a
negligent driver could maintain an action against the defendant. An
ordinance designed for the protection of a certain class of people may
set a standard of care and the plaintiff may maintain an action although
that statute does no more than prescribe the penalty. Schell v. Dubois,
94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664 (i916); Corbett v. Scott, 243 N.Y.
66, 152 N.E. 467 (1926); Drake v. Fenton, 237 Pa. St. 8, 85 Ad.
14 (1912); Berdos v. Tremont etc. Mills, 2o9 Mass. 489, 95 N.E.
876 (i9ii). These are usually denominated safety statutes. The
Court of Appeals regarded this as a safety measure and argued that
compliance with the statute would keep incompetent drivers off the road.
But the Supreme Court held that this was not a safety, but an indemnity
ordinance, and that the failure to obtain a license was not the proximate
cause of the injury. The court drew an analogy to cases in which it was
decided that a plaintiff who operated a car without proper license plates
was not liable to third party for non-compliance with the ordinance or
statute. Gonchar v. Kelson, 114 Conn. 262, 158 Ad. 545 (1932);
Kurtz v. Morse Oil Co., 114 Conn. 336, 158 Ad. 9o6 (1932); Ham
v. Greensboro Ice and Fuel Co., 204 N.C. 614, 169 S.E. 18o (I933).
The Massachusetts rule is contra. Bellenger v. Nally, 282 Mass. 523,
185 N.E. 346 (i933); Emeneau v. Doyle, 282 Mass. 280, 184 N.E.
720 (1933).
It would seem that this ordinance would not ordinarily be regarded
as a safety measure and that the purpose of the statute was more accu-
rately stated by the Supreme Court than by the Court of Appeals. But
the analogy to the car license cases is not perfect. Such statutes are passed
for the primary purpose of obtaining revenue. This was an indemnity
ordinance and the plaintiff is without indemnity. The case is unusual
on its facts and does not fall into any of the accepted classifications. The
case can be justified on the ground that where the ordinance does not
specifically give the injured party a cause of action, the plaintiff must
show that this was a safety measure, which he can not do. The rule
might conceivably be relaxed to include indemnity measures. Another
view would be that since some ordinances in cities of other states have
declared that the injured party may maintain an action, and since such
ordinances and statutes have bee* held constitutional, Levy v. Daniels
U-Drive-Auto Renting Co., io8 Conn. 333, 143 Ad. 163, 6I A.L.R.
846 (1928), the remedy lies with the legislature.
R. W. VANDEMARK
